A restore... and your entire system belongs to the hacker - the story from CVE-2025-12762
Recently, PostgreSQL — one of the leading open-source database management systems — released an urgent security patch.

Introduction to CVE-2025-12762
To better understand this vulnerability, we will go through some basic concepts. PgAdmin is known as the most popular PostgreSQL management and development tool today, widely used by system administrators (DBAs), developers, and organizations operating data infrastructure. It is open-source software that provides a graphical user interface (GUI) to manage PostgreSQL databases in an intuitive, easy-to-use, and efficient way.

PgAdmin fully supports basic to advanced administration functions, including:
Managing connections to multiple PostgreSQL servers
Creating, editing, and deleting tables, schemas, views, functions
Running SQL queries with the Query Tool
Monitoring and managing sessions, processes, locks
Backing up and restoring data
Monitoring database activity and performance
Integrating tools for developers and DBAs
CVE-2025-12762 was disclosed by cybersecurity experts on November 13, 2025. According to the report, this is a Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability found in pgAdmin 4. This could allow attackers to interact directly with the database to steal information and create new administrator accounts.
Scope of Impact
Affected versions: pgAdmin 4 ≤ 9.9 when running in "server mode" and using the restore function from a PLAIN format dump file.
Severity Assessment
CVE-2022-45822 is rated as CRITICAL with the following scores:
NIST: NVD Base Score: 9.8 - CRITICAL Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
CNA: Patchstack Base Score: 9.1 - CRITICAL Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Analysis and Exploitation of the Vulnerability
As mentioned above, this is a Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability affecting pgAdmin 4 running in server mode when performing a restore from dump files in PLAIN format. If the dump file contains special commands, pgAdmin might accidentally execute them on the host machine.
An attacker would first log into the pgAdmin Web interface. From there, they could:
Access the pgAdmin file manager
Upload files to the pgAdmin temporary directory
Execute jobs like restore, backup, import/export

Are you wondering how attackers get the password to log in? Usually, they have three main ways to do it:
Method 1: Use a weak admin password. With this method, it might only take 10–50 tries to guess it if the password is "easy to guess."
Method 2: Passwords are exposed in configuration files like
config_distro.py,config_local.py, orservers.json. If the server is accessed or the configuration repo is leaked, attackers can get the login information.Method 3: Internal phishing to fake login information. This is quite common nowadays, where attackers use AI to create fake websites and emails that look legitimate to trick victims into providing login details.
After logging in, attackers will upload a PLAIN dump file with malicious content. The core issue is that in PLAIN format, PostgreSQL dumps allow the use of meta-commands “\!“, which is a legitimate feature of psql used to run commands on the operating system. Attackers just need to prepare dump files with seemingly legitimate SQL commands and upload them.

After uploading the file, the attacker just needs to request pgAdmin to restore the uploaded dump file. From there, they can access any database (usually postgres). As is known, pgAdmin does not filter, disable, or sandbox meta-commands (\!, \set, …) in PLAIN dump files.

Once the restore begins, the pgAdmin restore process:
Reads the dump file
Encounters the system command
\! somethingDirectly passes the command to the shell of the host running pgAdmin
At this point, the attacker can easily perform RCE on the system and write files, open a reverse shell, install a backdoor, modify configurations, or pivot the network. Finally, they will:
Check if the execution was successful (based on a marker file or log)
Spread malware, crypto-miners, or backdoors
Conduct lateral movement activities within the internal network
Recommendation
Update pgAdmin 4 to the patched version
Upgrade to pgAdmin 4 ≥ 9.10 — this version has fixed the vulnerability.
Check the current version:
pip show pgadmin4If deploying with Docker:
docker pull dpage/pgadmin4:latest
Temporarily disable the PLAIN Restore feature
Due to the vulnerability stemming from handling plain-format dump files, you should:
Only allow restores from Custom or Directory formats.
Prohibit or restrict users from uploading
.sqlPLAIN dump files until the update is complete.For deployments with a reverse proxy (Nginx, Apache), you can block
.sqluploads.
Limit access to pgAdmin (server mode)
pgAdmin should absolutely not be exposed to the Internet.
Only allow access:
From the internal LAN
From VPN
From firewall whitelist
On Linux:
ufw allow from 10.0.0.0/24 to any port 5050 ufw deny 5050
Summary
The CVE-2025-12762 vulnerability in pgAdmin 4 highlights a concerning reality: a seemingly harmless function like restoring a database from a dump file can become an attack point leading to Remote Code Execution and full server takeover. With a CVSS severity of 9.1, this vulnerability is particularly dangerous for systems operating in server mode, where many users can interact and upload files.
The issue lies in pgAdmin's handling of PLAIN dump files without adequately controlling input data, allowing attackers to insert malicious commands and execute them at the operating system level. This means the impact extends far beyond the pgAdmin application, directly threatening the server, database, and even related systems within the same infrastructure.
Therefore, immediate updates, comprehensive checks, and enhanced dump file controls are mandatory steps to protect the system. This incident is also an important reminder that in system security, supporting components like administrative tools can become critical weaknesses if not properly monitored and updated.






