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Understanding FakeCall: Mobile Threats from Mishing Malware

Updated
8 min read
Understanding FakeCall: Mobile Threats from Mishing Malware
T

Just a SOC Analyst ^^

The zLabs security research team has been tracking the development of a new variant of the FakeCall malware. This is a form of Vishing (voice phishing), where attackers use fake calls or voice messages to trick victims into providing sensitive information such as login credentials, credit card numbers, or bank account details.

Mishing techniques in FakeCall

Mishing is a term that encompasses phishing techniques targeting mobile devices, exploiting features like calls, messaging, and cameras. FakeCall includes the following mishing techniques:

  • Vishing (voice phishing): Attackers use fake calls to trick victims into revealing sensitive information or performing unusual actions.

  • Smishing (SMS phishing): Attackers send fraudulent SMS messages to lure victims into clicking malicious links or sharing sensitive information.

  • Quishing (QR code phishing): Exploiting malicious QR codes for phishing attacks.

  • Email-based mobile phishing: Attackers craft specially designed emails to execute phishing when accessed through mobile email apps.

Notably, FakeCall has a highly sophisticated Vishing attack mechanism, using malware to almost completely control the mobile device, including intercepting incoming and outgoing calls. This results in victims being redirected to malicious phone numbers controlled by attackers while the phone interface still displays the normal call number.

How FakeCall works

The attack begins when the victim downloads an APK file onto an Android device. This file acts as a dropper, with its main task being to install malicious payloads (FakeCall) onto the victim's device.

The FakeCall malware is designed to communicate with a Command and Control (C2) server, allowing it to receive commands to perform various actions to deceive users.

Figure 1. FakeCall’s attack chain

When launched, the application will prompt the user to set it as the default call handler. Once set as the default call handler, the application can manage all incoming and outgoing calls. Combined with OutgoingCallReceiver, the application captures the intent android.intent.action.NEW_OUTGOING_CALL and extracts the phone number using the getResultData() function. The application then displays a fake interface of the original com.android.dialer app, but with integrated malicious functions.

Figure 2: FakeCall's fake interface on the victim's device

Features of the New FakeCall Variant

Bluetooth Receiver and Screen Receiver

The new variant of FakeCall adds features like Bluetooth Receiver (monitoring Bluetooth status) and Screen Receiver (monitoring screen on/off status). Although there is no evidence of malicious behavior from these features yet, they may serve as new functions in future versions.

Accessibility Service

Another prominent feature is the Accessibility Service, which allows the malware to control the user interface and record screen events. Typical features include:

  • Monitoring Dialer Activity: Monitoring dialing activity, allowing the malware to detect when the user makes a call.

  • Automatic Permission Granting: Automatically granting permissions without user consent.

  • Remote Control: Remotely controlling the entire device interface, allowing attackers to simulate user interactions.

Phone Listener Service

This feature acts as an intermediary communication channel between the malware and the Command and Control (C2) server, allowing attackers to issue commands and perform actions on the infected device. Some commands are listed below:

CommandDescription
ConnectedSend device information to the C&C server
Load settingsQuery the C&C, send the device's IMEI to get the pre-configured settings from the attacker for this device
Send SMSSend an SMS to the phone number received from the C&C
Delete SMSCheck if it has OP_READ_SMS permission and delete an SMS
Upload ContactsSend a JSON file containing all phone numbers in the victim's contact list to the C&C server
Upload CallLogsSend a list of incoming and outgoing calls from the device to the C&C server
Upload SMSUpload SMS messages that match the filter received from the C&C server
Delete AppDelete a specific application from the device
Upload LocationSend the device's location to the C&C server
Start RecordUsed to start recording for a specific period and send the recording to the C&C server
End CallEnd a call on the victim's device
Upload AppInfoSend a list of all installed applications on the victim's device to the C&C server
Live ONOpen a live stream from the victim's camera to the C&C server
Live SwitchSwitch between the front and rear cameras
Live OFFClose the live stream from the victim's camera
Add ContactAdd a new contact to the device with data specified from the C&C server
Delete ContactDelete a contact from the device
Delete CallLogDelete a specific call history entry by its ID
Take PicturesTake a picture from the camera and send it to the C&C server

Furthermore, this new variant also has more advanced commands to serve the purpose of controlling and interacting with the victim's device:

CommandDescription
turnoff_bluetoothTurn off Bluetooth
get_thumbnail_listRetrieve a list of thumbnails from the DCIM folder of external storage and send them to the C&C server
upload_thumbnail_listCompress thumbnails into .jpg and upload to the C&C server
Upload_full_imageCompress and send a specific image to the C&C server
Delete_imageDelete a specific image as specified by the C&C server
Remote_homekeyUse accessibility services to simulate pressing the home button
Remote_wakeupCommand will unlock the device screen and disable the auto-lock function
Remote_clickUse accessibility features to simulate a tap on the device at coordinates specified by the C&C server
Request_phoneManagerCheck which app is set as the default dialer manager
Request_phone_callSet the malware as the default dialer manager
Remote_startInitiate a video stream recording the device screen
Remote_stopStop the video stream recording the device screen
Remote_get_imageCapture a screenshot of the victim's device

Impact Level

The main function of this malware is to monitor outgoing calls and transmit this information to an external Command and Control (C2) server. However, its impact is quite significant:

  • Identity Fraud: By tricking users into setting it as the default call handler, the application can manipulate dialing by replacing legitimate numbers with fake ones through the setResultData() method, deceiving users into making fraudulent calls.

  • Hijack Calls: The malware can intercept and control incoming and outgoing calls, even creating fake calls. Users may not be aware of this until they remove the application or restart the device.

An example attack scenario is:

  • When the victim attempts to contact their financial institution, the malware redirects this call to a fake number controlled by the attacker.

  • This malicious application deceives users by displaying a fake call interface identical to the Android call interface, showing the victim the real bank's phone number.

  • The victim will not be aware of this deception because the attacker also mimics behaviors similar to a real bank to trick the victim.

  • Finally, the attacker tricks the victim into revealing sensitive information and uses it to gain unauthorized access to the victim's financial accounts.

Recommendations

FPT Threat Intelligence recommends organizations and individuals take several measures to prevent this malware:

  • Educate and raise user awareness: Enhance awareness of Vishing, Smishing, and Quishing threats.

  • Do not download applications from unknown sources: Recommend users only install applications from Google Play or trusted sources.

  • Be cautious with app permissions: Before granting permissions to an app, users should check if the request is reasonable for the app's functionality.

  • Use mobile security software: Install mobile security applications with anti-malware features.

  • Regularly update software and operating systems: Google and phone manufacturers regularly release security patches. Updating devices helps users avoid security vulnerabilities that malware can exploit.

  • Limit app permissions: Use features to restrict access permissions as needed, allowing users to grant permissions only when the app truly needs them and suspend them when not necessary.

  • Use multi-factor authentication (MFA): Apply multi-factor authentication for bank accounts and important accounts.

  • Monitor new malware variants: Use Threat Intelligence services to receive the latest notifications about malware and malicious campaigns.

IOCs related to FakeCall malware

Hashes

SHA256Type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Package name

Value
com.qaz123789.serviceone
com.sbbqcfnvd.skgkkvba
com.securegroup.assistant
com.seplatmsm.skfplzbh
eugmx.xjrhry.eroreqxo
gqcvctl.msthh.swxgkyv
ouyudz.wqrecg.blxal
plnfexcq.fehlwuggm.kyxvb
xkeqoi.iochvm.vmyab

IPs

Value
47.242.149.4
47.242.20.245
47.242.38.176
47.245.63.185
47.91.14.5
8.209.241.108
8.209.250.15
8.210.198.162
8.218.68.96

Domains

Value
allcallpush01[.]com
allcallpush02[.]com
allcallpush09[.]com
allcallpush12[.]com
allcallpush15[.]com
chaowen000[.]com
chaowen006[.]com
chaowen105[.]com
ending052[.]com
tewen006[.]com
tewen007[.]com
vipyaooba[.]com
wending015[.]com

References

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