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Hello Again: Bypassing TPM Lockout to Brute-Force Windows Hello and BitLocker PINs

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Hello Again: Bypassing TPM Lockout to Brute-Force Windows Hello and BitLocker PINs

Overview

In November 2026, six researchers from Technische Universität Berlin (TU Berlin) published "Hello Again: Exploiting Replay Protected Monotonic Counters to Brute-Force Windows Hello PINs", presented at ACM CCS '26 (an updated arXiv version was posted on November 13, 2026).

The research question sounds simple: why is a PIN of only four digits considered secure? Microsoft's answer has always been: because the TPM limits wrong guesses. Per Microsoft's documentation, the TPM locks after 32 wrong tries and forgets only one failure every 10 minutes. Under that limit, exhausting all 10,000 four-digit combinations takes about 69 days; a six-digit PIN takes 19 years.

That entire guarantee rests on one assumption: the wrong-guess counter cannot be reset. The TU Berlin team shows that on many x86 machines currently on the market, that assumption does not hold:

PIN length Under documented lockout Windows Hello attack (AMD) BitLocker attack (Intel)
4 digits 69 days 40 hours 5 hours*
6 digits 19 years 168 days 20 days
8 digits 1,903 years 46 years 6 years

*BitLocker accepts a four-digit PIN only if an administrator lowers the default six-digit minimum.

In end-to-end tests on locked, encrypted hardware, the researchers recovered a Windows Hello PIN after 236 tries in 57 minutes, and a six-digit BitLocker PIN after 236 tries in 6 minutes 55 seconds.

The research documents two flaws that break rollback protection, plus a third finding that is arguably more concerning:

  1. Winbond SPI flash leaks its HMAC key under voltage glitching — allowing arbitrary counter values to be forged.
  2. AMD firmware does not verify that a counter increment actually happened — an interposer board can suppress the increment unnoticed. AMD assigned CVE-2026-43613.
  3. On AMD machines without RPMC-capable flash, the researchers found no rollback protection at all — writing back an old copy with an ordinary flash programmer resets the counter to zero.

Important note on scope: This is a physical-access attack — it requires opening the case, removing the flash chip and wiring in a custom board. Neither the paper nor the vendor advisories report exploitation outside the lab. The realistic risk scenario is a lost, stolen or seized device — not a remote attack.


Research Context

Attribute Detail
Paper title Hello Again: Exploiting Replay Protected Monotonic Counters to Brute-Force Windows Hello PINs
Authors Christian Werling, Matti Finder, Hans Niklas Jacob, Julian Prein, Niclas Kühnapfel, Jean-Pierre Seifert
Affiliation Technische Universität Berlin
Venue ACM CCS '26; updated arXiv version November 13, 2026
CVE CVE-2026-43613 (AMD), CVSS 4.0: 5.1
Released artifacts Interposer board firmware, PCB designs, KVM attack scripts, the HMAC keys extracted from the test system's Winbond chip, trace excerpts
Observed in-the-wild exploitation None

On how "ready" the tooling is: Although the tooling is public, the authors stress that the attacks on RPMC systems are not plug-and-play: they require removing the flash chip, soldering in a socket, and using a board of their design. The AMD-without-RPMC case is far simpler — it needs only an off-the-shelf flash programmer, no custom board.


Technical Analysis

1. Why Can the Lockout Counter Be Reset at All?

1.1. A "firmware" TPM has no secure storage of its own

There are two common kinds of TPM:

Type Characteristics
dTPM (discrete TPM) A separate chip on the mainboard with non-volatile (NV) memory inside the chip
fTPM (firmware TPM) Runs on a coprocessor inside the CPU: AMD PSP/ASP, Intel CSME (PTT), or Microsoft Pluton

Most Windows 11 PCs today use an fTPM. The problem is that these coprocessors have no secure on-chip NV memory. The TPM's entire state — including the wrong-guess counter — is encrypted and integrity-protected with device-unique keys, then stored on the mainboard's SPI flash chip (the same chip that holds the BIOS/UEFI).

Encryption prevents an attacker from reading or altering the state. But it cannot prevent one thing: writing back an old copy.

1.2. Rollback attacks — "snapshot," then "restore"

The attack idea is intuitive:

1. Copy the full flash contents while the wrong-guess counter = 0
2. Guess PINs until close to the lockout threshold (counter rises)
3. Write the old copy back onto the flash chip
   → TPM reloads the old state → counter = 0
4. Repeat from step 2

The old copy is entirely valid — it is encrypted and signed with the device's own key, because the TPM itself produced it. The TPM has no way to know it is "yesterday's copy" — unless there is a time source or counter that cannot go backwards.

1.3. RPMC — a solution designed for exactly this problem

RPMC (Replay Protected Monotonic Counters) is a supplementary SPI flash specification from JEDEC (JESD260, 2021), based on a 2013 Intel document. The idea: build into the flash chip counters that can only increase, authenticated cryptographically.

Component Role
Root key Written exactly once; authenticates the counter
HMAC session key Derived from the root key and "Key Data"; signs each command (HMAC-SHA256)
5 commands Write Root Key · Update HMAC Key Register · Increment Monotonic Counter · Request Monotonic Counter · Read Extended Status

When the TPM saves new state, it increments the RPMC counter and binds the counter value to the state. At boot, the TPM requests the current counter value (the Request command — its response is signed by the chip) and compares it with the value in the state. If the state is older than the counter → rollback detected.

The Windows 10 and 11 hardware compatibility programs have required RPMC-style rollback protection for certain platforms, including AMD Zen 2 and newer — though the Windows 11 requirements do not mandate a specific method.

A detail in the specification itself: JEDEC states that RPMC offers no protection against hardware attacks. "Hello Again" is, in essence, a test of how wide that self-acknowledged gap is in shipping products.


2. The Interposer Board — Core Component Costs About $5

The attack device is built around a Raspberry Pi Pico 2W (RP2350 microcontroller, about $5) — using PIO state machines to emulate SPI, with no expensive FPGA needed.

Component Function
Raspberry Pi Pico 2W Impersonates the flash chip; intercepts and alters commands
QSPI-capable multiplexer Switches the CPU between the real flash and the Pico
Logic-level shifter Converts 3.3 V ↔ 1.8 V
MOSFET "crowbar" on the flash supply rail Produces voltage glitches
Logic analyzer Monitors SPI traffic

The flash chip is desoldered from the mainboard and replaced with a header connecting to the interposer. The team built two versions: v1 (glitching + interposition) had signal-integrity problems at the Framework laptop's SPI clock speed; v2 is replay-only with a faster multiplexer, used only for the Framework result. The team also slowed the flash link in firmware because the board could not keep up at full speed.

The entire PIN-guessing process was automated: a script read the screen, typed PINs and restarted the machine through a KVM switch.


3. Flaw #1 — Winbond Flash Leaks Its HMAC Key Under Glitching

Chips involved:

Chip Where
Winbond W25R128JV (3 V), W25R128JW (1.8 V) Lab testing
Winbond W25R256JW Framework Laptop 13
Winbond 74M12JWSIQ ("Authentication Flash," using RPMC commands) Lenovo IdeaPad 5 Pro

Mechanism: A short voltage dip (crowbar glitch) while the chip handles a signature causes the HMAC engine's output to remain in a register readable via the Read Extended Status command. Two effects were observed:

  • After an Increment, the chip sometimes returned a valid signature even though the request was unsigned.
  • After Update HMAC Key Register, the chip sometimes returned the session HMAC key itself — regardless of whether the update was signed.

Speed: with their best settings, the researchers extracted the key in about one second — fast enough to glitch on demand whenever needed.

Consequence: per the authors, this is almost equivalent to leaking the root key — the attacker can forge Request responses with any counter value. The interposer simply tells the TPM "the counter is still at its old value," with a valid signature.

Remediation: requires a hardware fix — no register reuse, and never storing secrets in readable registers. Winbond says it is evaluating a possible silicon revision but has committed to no fix or timeline.

An accompanying weakness on the Intel side: constant "Key Data"

On the Intel test laptop, the firmware used a constant Key Data value of 0x1 across every boot and session. On its own this is a minor weakness. Combined with the Winbond flaw, it means a single glitch is enough — the extracted HMAC key remains usable for every subsequent boot. Intel PSIRT initially rejected this report as informative, then reopened it in September 2026 and classified it as a "security weakness" rather than a "vulnerability."


4. Flaw #2 — AMD Does Not Check That the Counter Actually Incremented (CVE-2026-43613)

This flaw needs no glitching, and works with any RPMC flash, including chips without Winbond's flaw.

How the two platforms differ:

Platform After sending an Increment command
Intel Sends a Request command to re-read the counter — the response is signed by the chip
AMD Does not re-read. Only queries Read Extended Status — which is unsigned

Exploitation: the interposer intercepts the Increment so the flash chip never receives it, then answers Read Extended Status with a "success" code. AMD's firmware accepts this without requiring a signed response. Result: the counter in the flash chip stays put, while the TPM believes it has increased.

AMD's advisory (AMD-SB-7079, November 17, 2026):

Attribute Detail
CVE CVE-2026-43613
CVSS 4.0 5.1 — AV:P/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
CWE CWE-345 — Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity
Description Insufficient authentication of RPMC Increment completion in the ASP firmware could let a physically present attacker suppress counter updates on systems with RPMC-capable SPI flash, bypassing rollback protection
Threat model position Attacks requiring physical access are "outside of the AMD product security threat model" — but AMD acknowledges RPMC is intended to stop exactly this type of interposer attack, and will release firmware updates
Fix timeline November 2026 → February 2027 depending on product line; one "not public" product has no date

Product lines on the fix list: Ryzen (desktop, mobile, Ryzen AI 300/400, AI Max 300/400), Ryzen Threadripper / Threadripper PRO, Athlon, EPYC 4004/4005, EPYC Embedded, Ryzen Embedded, and the Z1/Z2 handheld chips. Most consumer fixes target November–December 2026; Embedded lines target February 2027.

Two gaps in AMD's advisory worth noting:

  1. The advisory covers only systems with RPMC flash. It says nothing about AMD machines without RPMC — where the researchers showed rollback works with no custom board (see section 5).
  2. The advisory does not state whether the fix blocks downgrading to older, unpatched firmware. The researchers stress this is a mandatory condition — otherwise an attacker simply flashes the old firmware and attacks as before. They propose eFuses or similar mechanisms for anti-downgrade protection.

5. Finding #3 — AMD Without RPMC: No Rollback Protection Found

On two AMD desktops without RPMC flash — an ASUS TUF B450-Plus (Zen 2) board and an MSI PRO B850-P (Zen 5) board — the researchers only needed to write back an old SPI image with a flash programmer to reset the fTPM's lockout counter to zero.

No interposer. No glitching. Just an off-the-shelf SPI flash programmer and the ability to open the case.

The authors assess that AMD SoCs likely have no standalone rollback protection in the absence of RPMC-style flash — while cautioning that a sample of two machines may not represent all AMD systems.

Compared with Intel: three Intel systems without RPMC (NUC, MSI, Acer) all detected and rejected naive rollback. Per the analysis the paper cites, Intel's CSME uses an anti-replay table with an internal timer-based counter when RPMC is absent.

A notable paradox: On Intel, having RPMC was worse than not having it. Intel machines without RPMC rejected rollback; the Intel machine with Winbond RPMC flash was bypassed through the key leak. That is why the authors recommend Intel revert to its pre-RPMC rollback protection, at least as a short-term measure.


6. Tested Devices

Device Platform Flash chip RPMC Naive rollback
Intel NUC6i3SYK (2015) Intel Winbond W25Q64FV No Rejected
ASUS TUF B450-Plus (2019) AMD Zen 2 Winbond W25Q256JW No Accepted
Lenovo IdeaPad 5 Pro (2021) AMD Zen 3 Winbond 74M12JW Yes (Auth. Flash) Rejected
Lenovo ThinkPad T15 Gen 2 (2021) Intel Winbond W25R256JV Yes Rejected
MSI PRO B760M-P (2024) Intel Winbond W25Q256JW No Rejected
MSI PRO B850-P (2024) AMD Zen 5 Macronix MX25U25671G No Accepted
Framework Laptop 13 (2024) Intel Winbond 25R256JW Yes Rejected → bypassed via leaked HMAC key
HP OmniBook 3 (2025) AMD GigaDevice 25LR256 Yes Rejected → bypassed via Increment suppression
Acer Aspire 14 AI (2025) Intel Macronix MX25U25672G No Rejected

How to read this table: "Rejected" means naive rollback (just writing back an old image) failed — it does not mean the device is immune. Both the HP OmniBook 3 and the Framework Laptop 13 rejected naive rollback but were bypassed through the two flaws in sections 3 and 4. Moreover, the AMD flaw (section 4) works with any RPMC flash, so other AMD machines with RPMC are also in scope until patched.


7. End-to-End Tests

7.1. Windows Hello — HP OmniBook 3 (AMD Ryzen AI 5 330), via Increment suppression

  • BitLocker-encrypted drive, sitting at the lock screen
  • PIN 1235 recovered after 236 tries in 57 minutes
  • Measured rate: about 4.14 tries per minute
  • Windows forced a restart every 5 wrong attempts, but no lockout delay applied — because the TPM counter was continually reset

7.2. BitLocker TPM+PIN — Framework Laptop 13 (Intel Core Ultra 5 125H), via Winbond key leak

  • PIN 123457 recovered after 236 tries in 6 minutes 55 seconds
  • Measured rate: about 34.1 tries per minute
  • BitLocker's pre-boot PIN prompt has no limit of its own — each counter reset yields 32 fresh tries

7.3. Full worst-case time table (per the paper)

Scenario 4 digits 6 digits 8 digits
No rollback, 2-hour recovery* 833 days 228 years 22,831 years
No rollback, 10-minute recovery (Microsoft default) 69 days 19 years 1,903 years
With rollback — Windows Hello 40 hours 168 days 46 years
With rollback — BitLocker 5 hours 20 days 6 years

*The researchers observed a 2-hour recovery time on two Intel Core Ultra 5 systems — different from the 10-minute default in Microsoft's documentation.

Two paths independent of the target application: The authors stress that pairing "AMD ↔ Hello" and "Intel ↔ BitLocker" was only a test choice. In principle, either method works against either PIN — stated as an assessment, not cross-tested.


8. Microsoft Pluton Is Not Exempt

Microsoft Pluton is Microsoft's own fTPM, running on a dedicated core. The paper assesses that Pluton on AMD is affected by the Increment suppression flaw just as AMD's own fTPM is — because running Microsoft code on a dedicated core does not change the fact that state is still stored on external flash through the same controller. Note: this is the authors' assessment, not directly demonstrated by testing.


9. What Does an Attacker Gain From a PIN?

Target Consequence
BitLocker PIN (TPM+PIN) Decrypts the entire drive — the data-protection layer for a lost or stolen device
Windows Hello PIN Unlocks device-bound cryptographic keys that Hello protects
Windows Hello for Business Access to Hello-based enterprise SSO
Some configurations May satisfy an authentication step otherwise protected by MFA

That last point is why this goes beyond "losing a laptop": in an enterprise using Hello for Business, a stolen laptop can become an entry point into the organization's identity system.


10. Secondary Flash Chip Findings

Finding Vendor Severity per the authors
Integer overflow — the 32-bit counter wraps from maximum to 0 (about 4–6 weeks in practice) Winbond, Macronix, GigaDevice Minor for NV state rollback, but serious for counter-based firmware anti-downgrade
Counter corruption — glitching during Request returns a value lower than the real one yet still validly signed (~10% success) GigaDevice Low

The RPMC specification does not define behavior when a counter reaches its maximum — unlike eMMC's RPMB, which rejects further increments. The researchers sent a proposal to JEDEC in April 2025; as of publication, the specification has not been updated.


Risk Summary

Risk Dimension Level Rationale
Exploitation prerequisites High (difficult) Requires physical access, opening the case, removing the flash chip; RPMC systems need a custom board and soldering skill
Observed in-the-wild exploitation None Neither the paper nor vendor advisories report exploitation outside the lab
Degradation of protection Very High Six-digit BitLocker PIN: 19 years → 20 days; four-digit Hello PIN: 69 days → 40 hours
Impact if exploited Critical Full drive decryption; access to device-bound keys, enterprise SSO, possibly bypassing MFA
Hardware scope Broad AMD machines using fTPM (most modern Ryzen lines), Intel machines with Winbond RPMC flash, very likely Pluton on AMD
Patch status Partial AMD: timeline Nov 2026–Feb 2027; Winbond: no commitment; Intel: not deemed an Intel vulnerability; Microsoft: only raised the recommended PIN length
Gap no one has claimed Concerning AMD machines without RPMC — not covered by AMD's advisory; the attack needs only an ordinary flash programmer
Tooling availability Medium–High Firmware, PCB designs and scripts are public; the core component costs about $5

IOCs & Artifacts

This is hardware vulnerability research, not a malware campaign — there are no network IOCs or malware hashes*. Instead, this section lists exposure indicators and signs of physical tampering.*

Vulnerability identifiers

CVE-2026-43613   AMD — RPMC Increment Suppression (CVSS 4.0: 5.1, CWE-345)
AMD-SB-7079      AMD security bulletin (November 17, 2026)
Intel 2026-11-16-001   Intel security announcement "Hello Again" (November 16, 2026)

Exposure check on AMD machines (from Linux)

Linux kernel 5.19 and later exposes RPMC status through the ccp driver. Boot a live Linux environment and run:

grep . /sys/bus/pci/drivers/ccp/*/rpmc_*
  • The output shows whether RPMC is present and enabled.
  • Missing files do not prove that RPMC is absent.
  • The fwupd tool also reports this status as "AMD SPI Replay protections."

Interpreting the result:

Result Meaning
RPMC present and enabled Affected by CVE-2026-43613 until patched firmware is installed
RPMC absent / disabled Per the paper's results, there may be no rollback protection at all — higher risk, and AMD's advisory does not cover this case

Exposure check on Intel machines

There is no software check. Intel offers no equivalent interface. The only way is to open the machine and look for a Winbond flash chip marked 25R or 74M, or log SPI traffic.

Flash chips confirmed in the research

Winbond W25R128JV / W25R128JW / W25R256JV / W25R256JW   (25R series — RPMC)
Winbond 74M12JW / 74M12JWSIQ                             ("Authentication Flash")
GigaDevice 25LR256                                       (HP OmniBook 3 — counter corruption flaw)

Signs of physical tampering to check

  • Tamper seals or case screws showing signs of removal
  • The SPI flash chip showing traces of resoldering, or replaced with a socket/header
  • Unfamiliar wires attached near the BIOS chip area
  • Abnormally frequent restarts in the event log while no user was present
  • SPI flash link speed in firmware settings lowered from its default

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

Note: ATT&CK is designed around network intrusion; physical hardware attacks map only partially. The table below is for reference.

Tactic ID Technique Manifestation in the research
Initial Access T1200 Hardware Additions Inserting an interposer board between the CPU and the SPI flash chip
Defense Evasion T1542.001 Pre-OS Boot: System Firmware Overwriting SPI flash contents with an old image (rollback)
Defense Evasion T1562 Impair Defenses Neutralizing the TPM's dictionary-attack lockout
Credential Access T1110.001 Brute Force: Password Guessing Automated Windows Hello / BitLocker PIN guessing via KVM
Credential Access T1552.004 Unsecured Credentials: Private Keys Extracting the HMAC key from the Winbond chip via voltage glitching
Collection T1005 Data from Local System Decrypting the BitLocker drive after recovering the PIN
Credential Access / Lateral Movement T1550 Use Alternate Authentication Material Using Hello device-bound keys for enterprise SSO (authors' assessment, not tested)

Expert Assessment

The core lesson: a short PIN is only safe when guesses are limited, and that limit is only as strong as where the counter lives. Microsoft allows four-digit PINs on sound reasoning: 10,000 combinations is far too few with no limit, but enough if the TPM allows 32 tries and then makes you wait. This research breaks no cryptography and no TPM — it simply shows that on most machines today, that counter sits on a flash chip outside the CPU, and can be copied back. A security guarantee built on "the counter cannot go backwards" collapses completely when that assumption is false.

The RPMC paradox on Intel deserves emphasis. RPMC was introduced to strengthen rollback protection. Yet on the Intel machines tested, machines without RPMC rejected rollback, while the machine with Winbond RPMC flash was bypassed. A new security component, implemented with a flaw, can replace an older mechanism that was working well — and leave the system weaker. That is why the authors' recommendation to Intel sounds counterintuitive but is entirely sensible: go back to the pre-RPMC mechanism.

The responsibility gap is the most concerning part. Look again at each party's response:

  • AMD: fixes the Increment suppression flaw, but treats physical attacks as "outside the threat model," and the advisory does not address machines without RPMC.
  • Intel: "the research did not demonstrate a vulnerability in an Intel component" — because the Winbond flaw was required.
  • Winbond: evaluating, no committed fix or timeline.
  • Microsoft: rated "moderate," no CVE, no bounty; committed to raising the recommended minimum PIN to six digits.
  • JEDEC: no specification update after more than a year.

Taken individually, each response is defensible. Taken together, the end user is left with a system in which every party believes the fault lies with another. The vulnerability lives at the intersection of components from multiple vendors — JEDEC's specification, Winbond's chip, AMD/Intel firmware, Microsoft's PIN policy — and precisely because of that, no one owns the whole problem. This is a textbook hardware supply-chain vulnerability, and such vulnerabilities tend to persist for a very long time.

On "requires physical access" — do not underestimate it. The argument "you have to open the machine, so the risk is low" misses one thing: BitLocker TPM+PIN exists precisely to defend against someone with physical access. If the attacker cannot touch the machine, BitLocker has almost nothing to do. In other words, the scenario in this research is exactly the scenario BitLocker was designed for — and in that scenario, the default six-digit PIN now holds for roughly 20 days. For a deliberately stolen device, 20 days is not an obstacle.

A detail worth acknowledging about the authors' care: the paper clearly separates what was tested (two attack paths on two laptops, two AMD desktops with naive rollback) from what is only assessed (Pluton, cross-pairing methods with applications, possible MFA bypass). We have preserved that boundary throughout this article.

For Vietnam, the caveat comes first: the research has no country-level data, and there is no recorded in-the-wild exploitation anywhere. Even so, three aspects of the local context make these results worth attention from organizations:

First — AMD laptops are very common in the Vietnamese market, particularly in mainstream and office segments, including the new Ryzen AI lines. This is exactly the group of devices on AMD's fix list — and the fix depends on each laptop maker shipping an updated BIOS, a step that is often slow and rarely installed proactively by users.

Second — government agencies and businesses are deploying BitLocker to meet data-protection requirements, many with the default six-digit PIN or TPM-only mode. For laptops issued to officials and staff who travel frequently, the scenario of a device lost or seized for an extended period is real. This group should consider lengthening PINs now, without waiting for patches.

Third — the lifecycle of retired devices. Laptops and workstations being decommissioned, resold or sent for warranty repair often still have encrypted drives that have not been securely wiped. BitLocker encryption used to be considered sufficient reassurance. With these results, any device that has left the organization's control should be treated as at risk, and decommissioning procedures should securely erase data rather than rely on encryption alone.


Recommendations

Urgent — actionable now, no patch required

  1. Lengthen PINs by at least two digits. This is the most effective measure and depends on no vendor: each added digit multiplies attack time tenfold.
    • Windows Hello: from 4 to at least 6 (40 hours → 168 days)
    • BitLocker TPM+PIN: from 6 to at least 8 (20 days → 6 years)
  2. Windows Hello for Business: set the Minimum PIN length policy under Computer Configuration > Administrative Templates > System > PIN Complexity. If unset, Windows requires six digits by default.
  3. BitLocker: raise the Configure minimum PIN length for startup policy (allowed range 4 to 20 digits; default 6). Consider enabling Allow enhanced PINs for startup to permit letters and symbols — expanding the keyspace by many orders of magnitude compared with digits alone.
  4. If you use BitLocker in TPM-only mode (no PIN): move to TPM+PIN with a long PIN. Note that TPM+PIN relies on the same lockout this research undermines, so PIN length is the decisive factor.

Short term — monitor and update firmware

  1. AMD machines: install the firmware/BIOS update from your PC maker as soon as it is available for your model. AMD's timeline: November 2026–February 2027. AMD's fix reaches users through each OEM (HP, Lenovo, Dell, ASUS…) — check your maker's support page proactively.
  2. Check RPMC status on AMD machines with grep . /sys/bus/pci/drivers/ccp/*/rpmc_* from a live Linux environment, or via fwupd. Machines without RPMC should get priority physical protection because they are outside the scope of AMD's advisory.
  3. Intel machines with Winbond RPMC flash: no fix has been committed. Intel advises contacting your system manufacturer about available updates.
  4. In the meantime: per AMD's guidance — keep devices under physical control and watch for signs of physical tampering.

Long term — physical control and device lifecycle

  1. Apply tamper-evident seals to laptop case screws for devices holding sensitive data, and inspect them periodically, especially after a device has left your control (repairs, travel, seizure).
  2. Lost-device procedure: treat every lost device as data that may be decrypted within weeks. Immediately revoke keys and sessions tied to the device in your identity system (Entra ID / Active Directory), and disable the device for Hello for Business and SSO.
  3. Decommissioning: securely erase drives (crypto-erase or overwrite) rather than relying on BitLocker encryption alone.
  4. When procuring new devices: for high-security needs, consider devices with a discrete TPM (dTPM) — the lockout counter lives in memory inside the TPM chip, independent of external flash. Note that dTPMs carry their own risks (e.g., TPM bus sniffing), so evaluate against your organization's threat model.
  5. For servers and critical workstations: where firmware allows, enable firmware anti-downgrade protection so patches cannot be undone by reflashing an older BIOS.

References


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